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We tested colorblind and multicultural prejudice-reduction strategies under conditions 
of low and high interethnic confl ict. Replicating previous work, both strategies reduced 
prejudice when confl ict was low. But when confl ict was high, only the colorblind strategy 
reduced prejudice (Studies 1 and 2). Interestingly, this colorblind response seemed to refl ect 
suppression. When prejudice was assessed more subtly (with implicit measures), colorblind 
participants demonstrated bias equivalent to multicultural participants (Study 2). And, after 
a delay, colorblind participants showed a rebound, demonstrating greater prejudice than 
their multicultural counterparts (Study 3). Similar effects were obtained when ideology was 
measured rather than manipulated (Study 4). We suggest that confl ict challenges the tenets 
of a colorblind ideology (predicated on the absence of group differences) but not those of a 
multicultural ideology (which acknowledges difference).
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The United States Census Bureau predicts that, 
from 1995 to 2050, the size of the White popu-
lation in the USA will increase by 7.4%. During 
the same period, the Bureau expects the Black 
population to grow by about 70%, American 
Indians by 83%, Hispanics and Asians by more 
than 250% (Day, 1996). The states of Texas 
and California have already achieved ‘majority 
minority’ status: Whites now comprise less than 
50% of the population. Throughout Europe and 
North America, societies are becoming more 
diverse as a function of both migration and 
relatively high minority birthrates (sometimes 
accompanied by negative population growth 
among Whites). These trends steadily increase 
the potential for intergroup contact. Like most 
social change, this potential creates both op-
portunities and risks, and social science has 
expended considerable energy exploring ways 
to maximize the former and minimize the latter. 
Research in this area has borne fruit, and recent 
decades have witnessed a dramatic evolution 
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in social scientifi c and cultural approaches to 
ethnic relations (Park & Judd, 2005).
Initial attempts within social psychology to 
frame intergroup contact generally strove to 
de-emphasize the psychological boundaries 
that separate groups. These strategies derive 
from the irrefutable, but perhaps overly simple, 
argument that if people do not distinguish 
between groups in the fi rst place, they can never 
favor one group over another. In other words, 
prejudice cannot exist without categorization. 
Attempts to reduce or eliminate prejudice 
therefore focused on de-emphasizing categories 
by redefi ning subordinate groups in terms of 
a common ingroup identity (e.g. in the USA, 
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, 
American Indians, etc., can all be recategorized 
as American; Gaertner, Dovidio, Nier, Ward, & 
Banker, 1999; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & 
Dovidio, 1989), or, alternatively, on reducing 
the salience of group membership and focusing 
instead on personal identity (Brewer, 1991; 
Brewer & Miller, 1984). These approaches stress 
a colorblind (CB) ideology in that they mini-
mize attention to racial and ethnic divisions. 
Demonstrations in both laboratory and fi eld 
show that these CB approaches can signifi cantly 
reduce the expression of prejudice (Gaertner 
et al., 1999).
In spite of the ideological purity of the CB 
perspective, recent work has begun to argue that 
group differences can and should be acknowl-
edged. This change refl ects, perhaps, a growing 
awareness of some of the more subtle realities of 
a multi-ethnic society. First, human beings seem 
to automatically inexorably divide their social 
world according to categories like gender, age and 
race (Brewer, 1988). Even when it is irrelevant to 
the task at hand for example, neuropsychological 
research suggests that perceivers differentiate 
racial groups within a fraction of a second (Ito & 
Urland, 2003). People simply may not be able to 
ignore group membership completely. Second, 
individuals may not want to give up their ethnic 
or racial affi liations. A CB world, despite certain 
sociological advantages, threatens to strip the 
individual of part of his or her identity. It may 
seem counterproductive for minority groups to 
tenaciously maintain their collective identities. 
After all, minorities are often disadvantaged 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and arguably have the 
most to gain from the widespread adoption of a 
CB ideology. But pitted against these advantages, 
the smaller, more cohesive minority group may 
confer distinct psychological benefits to its 
members (Brewer, 1991; Correll & Park, 2005; 
Crocker & Major, 1989; Pickett & Brewer, 2001; 
Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). Third, explicitly 
acknowledging the divisions between groups 
may, in some cases, harmonize intergroup rela-
tions. Category differentiation can clarify roles 
and, in so doing, minimize the perception that 
groups are in direct competition with each 
other (Brown & Wade, 1987; Hornsey & Hogg, 
2000).
In light of the apparent inevitability of social 
categorization as well as its potential benefi ts, 
several recent perspectives on intergroup rela-
tions have advocated a framework that both 
acknowledges and appreciates differences 
between groups. Various incarnations of this 
idea include mutual intergroup differentiation 
(Hewstone & Brown, 1986), the multimodal per-
spective (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), a revised 
version of the common ingroup identity model 
(Gaertner et al., 2000), and the multicultural (MC) 
ideology (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 
2000; Wolsko et al., 2006). Recent data suggest 
that social categorization need not promote 
prejudice (Deffenbacher, Park, Judd, & Correll, 
2007) and that participants who acknowledge 
and appreciate diversity may express lower levels 
of prejudice (on par with those who adopt a CB 
perspective; Wolsko et al., 2000). For the sake of 
simplicity, in the remainder of this article, we use 
the term MC to refer generally to strategies that 
stress the appreciation of group differences.
We have focused thus far on the concept 
of prejudice or intergroup bias. These terms 
describe the tendency to evaluate ingroups 
(groups to which an individual belongs) more 
favorably than outgroups (groups to which the 
individual does not belong). In other words, 
prejudice represents an attitude—a subjec-
tive phenomenon. Of course, these subjective 
evaluations often interact with more objective 
characteristics of the situation. Research has 
long suggested that intergroup bias depends on 
the functional relationship between the groups. 
When groups compete with one another for 
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scarce resources, for example, prejudice tends 
to increase (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). That is, 
the introduction of (objective) intergroup con-
fl ict tends to exacerbate (subjective) feelings of 
bias. Realistic group confl ict theory, a ground-
breaking perspective on prejudice, formally 
proposed this relationship, and it remains a 
foundation for much of the theory and research 
on intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998; 
Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998; Hewstone, 
Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; 
for a review see Correll & Park, 2005).
In spite of the connection between confl ict 
and bias, we are aware of no research that has 
experimentally examined the impact of con-
fl ict on CB and MC prejudice-reduction strat-
egies. It is admirable to address the issue of 
prejudice under any circumstances, but for at 
least two reasons it seems crucial to consider 
how these strategies fare under conditions of 
intergroup stress. First, although prejudice 
often exists in relatively harmonious intergroup 
contexts, intergroup confl ict may be expected to 
exacerbate bias (Sherif et al., 1961). Bias should 
be more pronounced—and bias reduction should 
therefore be more critical and more diffi cult to 
achieve—during periods of intergroup confl ict. 
Second, the fact that a prejudice-reduction stra-
tegy works in the absence of confl ict does not 
necessarily mean that it will work when tension 
is high. As discussed in the following sections, 
the effi cacy of CB and MC approaches may 
change dramatically as a function of intergroup 
confl ict.
Multiculturalism in high-confl ict 
situations
As suggested by realistic group confl ict theory, 
the introduction of confl ict between groups 
should generally increase the magnitude of 
prejudice. But participants who espouse an 
MC ideology may be especially vulnerable to 
intergroup tension because, by defi nition, MC 
strategies promote the clear demarcation of 
groups. In confl ict situations, the salience of 
these divisions may induce partisans to attribute 
their disagreement to the nature or essence 
of the outgroup (e.g. ‘That’s just the kind of 
people they are.’). This argument draws on the 
category divide hypothesis, which suggests that 
group boundaries often serve as an explanation 
for perceived group differences, including dif-
ferences that arise from confl icts of interest 
(Miller & Prentice, 1999). If confl ict appears to 
be rooted in the unchangeable essence of the 
outgroup, individuals on both sides of the 
issue may abandon efforts at reconciliation 
and prepare for a fi ght. This line of reasoning 
suggests that MC participants may respond to 
confl ict with even greater hostility than indi-
viduals who adopt no prejudice-reduction 
strategy at all.
A more hopeful alternative is that individuals 
who adopt a MC ideology will exhibit reduced 
levels of prejudice in spite of the confl ict. Multi-
culturalism, after all, recognizes that groups 
should and do differ, and that differences should 
be tolerated, accepted, and even appreciated. 
From this vantage point, an intergroup dispute 
may be cast simply as a kind of difference, and—
in the mind of the observer—reactions to this 
unpleasant difference may be tempered by the 
awareness of other, more enjoyable differences 
(e.g. the groups’ distinct contributions to a rich 
common culture). Although this benefi t of the 
MC perspective would almost certainly break 
down in the case of extreme intergroup confl ict 
(e.g. violence), the strategy may ameliorate bias 
in more moderate situations.
Colorblindness in high-confl ict 
situations
CB ideologies present a different set of strengths 
and liabilities. Donald Campbell (1967), who 
pioneered theoretical and empirical efforts to 
address intergroup bias, recognized from the 
beginning that CB strategies, predicated on the 
absence of group differences, may falter when 
individuals are forced to acknowledge that 
groups really do vary. As he writes,
Remedial efforts focused on denying group dif-
ferences are apt to be unwittingly endorsing the 
most mischievous . . . misperceptions—wrongly 
agreeing that the particular group differences 
cause the hostility, unwittingly agreeing that were 
the actual group differences to exist, discrimination 
would be justifi ed. (p. 827)
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4)
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The very existence of intergroup confl ict, then, 
may undermine the premise of colorblindness. 
How will CB participants cope with the logical 
inconsistency between an ideology, which 
denies difference, and an intergroup confl ict, 
which exemplifi es it? If group members admit 
that their interests confl ict with those of the 
outgroup, the prejudice-reducing benefi ts of 
the CB ideology may disintegrate along with 
its founding assumption. If so, CB participants 
should respond to confl ict with as much hostility 
as anybody else.
But again, there is an alternative, more opti-
mistic possibility. Participants may adhere so 
strictly to the tenets of the CB ideology that 
they will trivialize or even deny the confl ict. If 
they can effectively ignore the disagreement, CB 
participants may preserve the illusion of inter-
group uniformity and protect the integrity of 
their ideology. This is an intriguing possibility. 
It depends on the individual’s capacity to sup-
press the cognitive and affective implications 
of confl ict and steadfastly maintain that the 
two groups are, in truth, no different from one 
another. This process (like the MC process 
involving tolerance of confl ict-as-difference) 
might be expected to collapse in cases of extreme 
confl ict, but, as a short-term strategy during 
moderate-level confl ict, the tendency to ignore 
disagreement and reassert the colorblind 
ideology may effectively preserve at least the 
veneer of goodwill.
The current research
The studies that follow tested CB and MC ap-
proaches under conditions of both low and high 
levels of intergroup confl ict. In the absence of 
confl ict, we expected both CB and MC ideologies 
to reduce bias relative to a control condition. 
Such a demonstration would simply replicate 
previous research (Gaertner et al., 1999; Wolsko 
et al., 2000). We were chiefl y concerned with 
the performance of the two strategies in confl ict 
situations. As outlined earlier, there is some basis 
for concern. Both CB and MC strategies may 
fail as confl ict grows more severe. This seems to 
present a particular liability for multiculturalism 
which may actually backfi re and induce greater 
prejudice. However, it is also possible that CB 
and MC strategies will retain some utility during 
confl ict—though through very different mech-
anisms. Colorblindness may prompt participants 
to deny the existence of a dispute, or deny the 
role of group membership in the dispute (e.g. 
disagreements about affi rmative action might be 
attributed to economic, not ethnic, differences). 
Multiculturalism may allow participants to 
recognize and accommodate the dispute as one 
(unpleasant) difference among a number of 
more palatable intergroup distinctions.
Study 1
Method
Participants One hundred and seventeen 
White students (61% female) in an introductory 
psychology course at the University of Colorado 
(CU) took part in this study, in partial completion 
of a course requirement.1
Design We randomly assigned participants 
to a control condition or to one of two ideo-
logical conditions in which participants 
received a persuasive message stressing the 
importance of adopting either a CB or an MC 
perspective on interethnic relations. Crossed 
with this manipulation of Ideology, we assigned 
participants to one of two levels of Confl ict, low 
versus high. The design of the study, then, was a 
3 (Ideology: control vs. CB vs. MC) × 2 (Confl ict: 
low vs. high) between-subjects design.
Materials and procedure
Ideology manipulation The manipulation of 
ideology was taken directly from Wolsko et al. 
(2000; see also Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). 
Participants in both the CB and MC conditions 
were asked to read a paragraph describing the 
testimony of sociologists and political scientists 
who stressed the importance of either ignoring 
ethnic divisions and learning to see others simply 
as fellow human beings (CB), or appreciating 
ethnic diversity and learning to see variation 
as an asset to society (MC). To strengthen the 
effect of these manipulations, participants in 
both ideological conditions were asked to list 
several benefi ts of the perspective about which 
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they had read and, fi nally, to examine a list of 
benefi ts ostensibly proposed by other students 
and place a check mark next to any items they 
had considered. Control participants spent a 
comparable time thinking about ethnic rela-
tions in the USA and listing their thoughts. 
Upon completion of their tasks, all participants 
were asked to complete a manipulation check, 
rating the degree to which they perceived ethnic 
groups as distinct and meaningful (1, not at all 
to 9, extremely).
Confl ict manipulation (newspaper article) Partici-
pants then read a fake newspaper article de-
scribing a proposal to alter the system through 
which students register for classes at CU. The 
new policy was ostensibly being considered by 
the school’s administration. We chose to focus 
on course registration because pilot testing 
indicated that students often found it diffi cult 
to enroll in classes they wanted or needed. 
We reasoned that competition for classes (a 
scarce resource) would provoke fairly strong 
reactions, capturing the essence of intergroup 
confl ict in the real world. Both the high- and 
low-Conflict articles described a policy ad-
vanced by the Hispanic Student Association 
(a fi ctional organization), which would give 
preferential treatment to minority students in 
the process of registering for classes. The policy 
was presented as an effort to make minority 
students feel more welcome at CU (the student 
body is roughly 90% White). The articles were 
identical except for a few key passages. The low-
Confl ict article described a proposal that would 
expand popular classes, allowing minorities 
who would have otherwise been waitlisted to 
enroll. Critically, this proposal would not re-
duce the space available to White students. Class 
size would simply be increased to accommodate 
the minority students—a slight adjustment 
given the small percentage of minorities at CU. 
The high-Confl ict article described an ‘early 
registration’ period during which minority (but 
not White) students would be able to enroll 
in popular classes, taking valuable spaces and 
further limiting the availability of those classes 
for Whites (a zero-sum situation). Both articles 
suggested that the administration was seriously 
considering the policy change.
Participants were told that the psychology 
department had been contacted by the admin-
istration and asked to help assess student reac-
tions to the proposal. According to this cover 
story, student comments about the policy would 
be delivered to the committee making the 
ultimate decision. As part of this ‘feedback,’ 
participants completed a manipulation check, 
rating the degree to which the proposed policy 
would increase or decrease minority and, 
separately, White students’ chances of success-
fully registering for classes (1, decrease; 5, no 
effect; 9, increase).
Measures of intergroup bias Finally, participants 
were given a packet of questionnaires to assess 
intergroup bias. Participants were told that these 
measures had been included by the psychology 
researchers and would not be shared with the 
administration. This packet included a group 
warmth thermometer, on which participants 
rated how warmly (100) or coolly (0) they felt 
toward a number of groups, including Whites 
and Hispanics as well as Blacks, Native Americans, 
and Asian Americans. Subsequently, partici-
pants completed eight Peabody sets (Peabody, 
1967). A Peabody set consists of two semantic dif-
ferential scales, which assess the same conceptual 
dimension, but which vary in their evaluative 
connotations. For example, items anchored 
with passive–assertive and pushy–cooperative both 
involve surgency. In the case of pushy–cooperative, 
surgency is presented as undesirable, whereas in 
the case of passive–assertive, surgency is presented 
as desirable. Participants fi rst rated Hispanics 
on these items, and then Whites, in each case 
marking a 6-inch line with an X to indicate the 
point between the two adjectives that best char-
acterized the group. Additional sets included 
lax–rigorous/lenient–strict, reckless–cautious/
daring–fearful, selective–undiscriminating/
picky–broadminded, conceited–modest/self-
confident–insecure, sociable–reclusive/
chatty–reserved, unrefl ective–intelligent/com-
monsensical–bookish, and insolent–respectful/
free-spirited–conventional.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4)
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Finally, participants were extensively debriefed. 
During this discussion, we attempted to ascertain 
whether participants believed the story about the 
new registration policy. We then explained that 
the policy was not actually being considered by 
the administration and outlined the purpose and 
importance of the manipulation, taking care to 
answer all questions and allay any concerns.
Results and discussion
In the present studies, we examined condi-
tion differences using a 3 (Ideology: Control vs. 
CB vs. MC) × 2 (Confl ict: high vs. low) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). With regard to the effects of 
Ideology, we specifi ed two orthogonal questions, 
each of which depends on a single-degree-of-
freedom test. First, we wished to know whether 
CB and MC differed from one another. Second, 
we wished to know whether the two experimental 
conditions (CB and MC), on average, differed 
from the control condition.
Manipulation checks To check the effi cacy of 
our Ideology manipulation, we examined par-
ticipants’ ratings of distinctiveness.2 As expected, 
participants in the CB condition (M = 4.90) rated 
ethnic groups as less distinct than participants in 
the MC condition (M = 6.18), F(1, 103) = 9.86, 
p = .002. The control condition fell between the 
two experimental conditions (M = 5.92) and did 
not differ from their average, F(1, 103) = 1.19, 
p = .28. No other effects were signifi cant.
To assess the effect of our Confl ict manipu-
lation, we examined perceptions of the degree 
to which the registration policy would (i) help 
or hurt minorities, and (ii) help or hurt Whites. 
Not surprisingly, participants in all conditions 
felt that the policy would help minorities 
(M = 8.33 on a 9-point scale), and Confl ict did 
not affect ratings of minority benefi t (high 
Confl ict M = 8.41, low Confl ict M = 8.25), F(1, 
111) = 1.04, p = .31. That is, the policy was 
seen as uniformly favorable to minorities, 
whether or not it threatened White interests. 
Interestingly, MC participants (M = 8.50) saw 
the policy as marginally more benefi cial to 
minorities than did CB participants (M = 8.13), 
F(1, 111) = 3.13, p = .080. Again, the control 
condition fell in between the two ideological 
conditions (M = 8.36) and did not differ from 
their average, F(1, 111) = .05, p = .82.
More importantly, ratings of the policy’s cost 
to Whites showed a pronounced effect of Con-
fl ict, F(1, 111) = 57.61, p < .0001. As intended, 
participants in the high-Conflict condition 
(M = 2.38) saw the policy as less favorable to 
White students than did participants in the 
low-Confl ict condition (M = 4.00). Open-ended 
responses also suggested that the high-Confl ict 
condition aroused frustration and even a degree 
of anger. One participant wrote (in large print), 
‘Not cool CU!!!’ Our analysis of the rating data 
also revealed an unexpected marginal inter-
action between Confl ict and the control versus 
ideology contrast code, F(1, 111) = 3.61, p = .060. 
This result reflects the control condition’s 
tendency to rate the policy as less favorable to 
Whites (relative to MC and CB) when confl ict 
was low, but as more favorable when confl ict 
was high.
These fi ndings suggest that we effectively 
manipulated both Ideology and Confl ict, in-
ducing CB participants to conceive of ethnic 
groups as less distinct (and MC participants to 
conceive of them as more distinct), and inducing 
high-Confl ict participants to perceive the policy 
as more costly to their interests than low-Confl ict 
participants (though both conditions recognized 
the potential benefi t for minorities).
Intergroup bias We computed two indices of 
bias, one based on the group warmth thermo-
meter, and one based on the Peabody sets. For 
the warmth ratings, we computed a simple dif-
ference score representing the degree to which 
each participant felt more warmly toward 
Whites than toward Hispanics (whose fi ctional 
student organization was promoting the policy 
change). For the Peabody sets, we calculated 
the degree to which participants ascribed positive 
(vs. negative) traits to each group. Like the 
thermometer, we defi ned prejudice as greater 
positivity toward Whites than Hispanics. A pat-
tern of prejudice might be indicated by rating 
Whites as more assertive than Hispanics on the 
assertive–passive scale and more cooperative than 
Hispanics on the pushy–cooperative scale. Peabody 
sets are noteworthy because such a response 
477
Correll et al. ideologies in conflict
would require participants to rate Whites as 
both high and low on surgency (high when sur-
gency is desirable, low when it is undesirable). 
Accordingly, this measure of prejudice is largely 
unconfounded with the particular semantic 
content of the traits involved. That is, high scores 
on the prejudice measure cannot result simply 
from differences in the perceived prevalence 
of particular characteristics among one group 
versus another. The thermometer and Peabody 
measures were correlated, r(117) = .47, p < .001. 
To improve reliability, we standardized and 
averaged the two scores to form an overall bias 
index.
Analysis of intergroup bias revealed several 
effects. The high-Confl ict condition differed 
from the low-Confl ict condition, F(1, 111) = 5.04, 
p = .027, and the CB condition differed from the 
MC condition, F(1, 111) = 4.63, p = .034. These 
main effects were qualifi ed by an interaction 
between Confl ict and the control versus ideology 
contrast code, F(1, 111) = 4.62, p = .034, as well 
as a marginal omnibus Confl ict × Ideology inter-
action, F(2, 111) = 2.89, p = .060. (See Table 1 
for condition means.)
To clarify these effects, we examined the impact 
of Ideology separately at high and low levels 
of Confl ict. When Confl ict was low, the CB and 
MC conditions did not differ from one other, 
F(1, 111) = 0.53, p = .47. But, on average, partici-
pants in both ideological conditions tended 
to report less bias than those in the control 
condition, F(1, 111) = 2.79, p = .098. These ef-
fects largely replicate previously documented 
effects of the MC and CB manipulations (Wolsko 
et al., 2000). When confl ict was high, however, 
we obtained a very different pattern. The CB 
condition reported signifi cantly less bias than 
the MC condition, F(1, 111) = 5.52, p = .021, 
and the control condition did not differ from 
the CB–MC average, F(1, 111) = 1.90, p = .17. 
On the surface, this result seems to suggest that 
CB strategies of prejudice reduction outperform 
MC strategies during confl ict.
Our suspicions were aroused, however, when 
we examined the main effect of Confl ict. In 
line with prior research (Sherif et al., 1961), we 
expected that bias would increase in a high-
confl ict situation. In the present study, par-
ticipants in the CB and control conditions 
counterintuitively reported less bias in the 
high-Confl ict condition than in the low-Confl ict 
condition (for those two conditions, F(1, 111) = 
4.80, p = .030). Indeed, only the MC condition 
showed the pattern predicted by realistic group 
confl ict theory, in which higher levels of confl ict 
produced greater bias (although the means did 
not differ statistically). We suspected that the 
CB participants (and perhaps the controls) were 
attempting to conceal any resentment aroused 
by the confl ict. Recall that the CB manipula-
tion stresses the importance of ignoring group 
differences. A confl ict of interest highlights 
distinctions between groups, so recognition 
of these differences violates the fundamental 
assumption of the CB ideology. Participants in 
that condition may therefore have been motiv-
ated to conceal, or even suppress, their concerns 
about the outgroup. (It also seems reasonable 
to suggest that a similar process was operating 
among the control participants. However, in the 
absence of a specifi c ideological manipulation, 
we lack concrete expectations about the pro-
cesses at work in that condition.) By contrast, 
Table 1. Means (SD) of standardized index of intergroup bias as a function of Ideology (control, colorblind or 
multicultural) and Confl ict (low or high) from Study 1
Ideology
Confl ict Control CB MC
Low 0.37 (1.09) –0.07 (0.54) 0.12 (0.62)
High –0.37 (0.60) –0.36 (0.64) 0.21 (0.87)
Note : Intergroup bias is based on a warmth thermometer rating of Whites minus Hispanics, and ratings on 
Peabody sets of the degree to which positive traits were ascribed to Whites, more so than to Hispanics. Each 
measure was fi rst standardized and then averaged to form the composite measure.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4)
478
MC participants, who have been told that group 
differences are acceptable, may see the dis-
agreement as less problematic for intergroup 
relations in the long run. MC individuals may 
therefore be more willing to express resentment 
in a high-confl ict situation.
Study 1 relied entirely on questionnaire meas-
ures, which are subject to strategic responding. 
This limitation presents a challenge in situ-
ations where publicly expressed views and pri-
vately held views may diverge. Study 2 sought 
to examine prejudice more subtly by including 
an implicit measure of intergroup attitudes. 
Implicit measures of prejudice have gained 
prominence in social psychology because, in 
theory, they can assess attitudes that partici-
pants would rather conceal (Devine, 1989; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). That 
is, the desire to appear unbiased does not neces-
sarily translate to unbiased performance on these 
indices. If confl ict sparks resentment, which CB 
participants feel but do not want to admit, they 
should report relatively egalitarian attitudes 
on explicit measures. But these individuals may 
have greater diffi culty inhibiting prejudice on 
implicit measures. In Study 2, we therefore pre-
dicted that, for CB participants, explicit and 
implicit bias measures should diverge. As in 
Study 1, bias should be low on explicit measures 
(over which participants have conscious control), 
but their resentment should manifest itself on 
more difficult-to-control implicit measures 
(Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), 
reaching levels equivalent to the MC and control 
conditions.
Study 2
Method
Participants and design One hundred and 
fourteen White students in an introductory 
psychology course (70% female) took part in this 
study in partial satisfaction of a course require-
ment.3 Like Study 1, the between-subjects portion 
of this experiment followed a 3 (Ideology: 
control vs. CB vs. MC) × 2 (Confl ict: high vs. low) 
design. However, in Study 2, we also included 
a within-subjects factor, Type of Measure, with 
two levels, Explicit and Implicit.
Materials and procedure Manipulation of both 
Ideology and Confl ict was accomplished as in 
Study 1. However, we included a more com-
prehensive manipulation check after the Ideo-
logy manipulation, consisting of an eight-item 
group differentiation scale (Wolsko et al., 2006), 
including items such as ‘A Black person is really 
just another White person but with dark skin.’
Measures of explicit bias We developed a com-
puterized questionnaire, which assessed percent 
estimates for a number of groups, including 
Whites and Hispanics. This measure asked 
participants to rate the prevalence of eight 
characteristics for both Whites and Hispanics. 
Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 
(0–10%) to 10 (91–100%), with 10% intervals 
in between. Traits included intelligent, patriotic, 
self-centered, and uptight (stereotypic of Whites), 
strong emotional bonds to family, religious, sexist and 
violent (stereotypic of Hispanics). Half of the 
traits in each group were positive in valence, 
and half were negative. In Studies 2 and 3, we 
used percent estimates rather than Peabody sets 
because they are simpler to implement, but it 
is important to note that, because valence and 
stereotypicality vary orthogonally in the per-
cent estimate traits, they (like the Peabody sets) 
minimize the confound between prejudice and 
stereotyping. The questionnaire was presented 
as a pilot test for a project being conducted by 
another researcher. The measures were pre-
sented on a series of screens, with one screen 
for each group.
Measure of implicit bias To assess implicit inter-
group bias, we adapted the Extrinsic Affective 
Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 2003). The 
EAST is similar to the Implicit Associations 
Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) in that it forces 
participants to classify two sets of stimuli—in 
this case, names and words—using a single set 
of response options. Bias is assessed as the extent 
to which one task interferes with the other. 
In the current study, the fi rst classifi cation in-
volved differentiating 20 White and 20 Hispanic 
surnames (e.g. Roberts, Johnson, Ramirez, 
Gonzalez) according to their ethnicity, pressing 
a blue button for Whites and a green button 
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for Hispanics. The names appeared in white 
print on a black background. On separate trials, 
intermingled with the name-categorization task, 
participants were asked to categorize other words 
according to color. These words appeared in a 
blue–green typeface. Half of the words were 
primarily blue and half were primarily green, 
but the two hues were chosen to be diffi cult to 
discriminate. In addition, 20 of the words were 
positive in valence (e.g. rainbow, happy) and 20 
were negative (e.g. cockroach, vomit). Because 
participants typically (if inadvertently) read 
words when they attempt to categorize them 
by color (Stroop, 1935), those who implicitly 
favor Whites over Hispanics should be faster 
to categorize positive words when those words 
appear in blue (requiring the button associated 
with Whites) rather than green (requiring the 
button associated with Hispanics). At the same 
time, they should be faster to categorize nega-
tive words when those words appear in green 
rather than blue. The EAST consisted of four 
blocks. The fi rst two blocks (20 trials each) 
provided opportunities to practice the name- 
and color-categorization tasks, respectively. The 
third block, consisting of 40 trials, allowed par-
ticipants to practice the two tasks together. The 
fi nal block constituted the test trials, presenting 
each color-word once in blue and once in green, 
and presenting each name twice, for a total of 
160 trials.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks Our three manipulation 
checks revealed patterns similar to Study 1. CB 
participants (M = 4.13) endorsed lower levels of 
distinctiveness among ethnic groups than did 
MC participants (M = 5.83), F(1, 108) = 12.80, 
p = .001. Control participants (M = 4.90) fell 
in between the two ideologies and did not 
differ from their average, F(1, 108) = 0.05, 
p = .83. Participants generally rated the policy 
as helpful to minorities (M = 8.19), and, in line 
with expectations, this rating did not depend 
on condition. Further, as predicted, partici-
pants in the high-Confl ict condition (M = 2.34) 
rated the policy as more harmful to Whites 
than participants in the low-Confl ict condition 
(M = 3.94), F(1, 107) = 34.33, p < .0001. No other 
effects were signifi cant.
Data preparation
Percent estimates We calculated the degree to 
which participants ascribed positive and negative 
attributes to Whites and, separately, Hispanics. 
We then calculated bias as the degree to 
which participants ascribed positive attributes 
to Whites more readily than negative attributes, 
but ascribed negative attributes to Hispanics 
more readily than positive attributes. [Explicit 
Bias = (White-positive—White-negative)—
(Hispanic-positive—Hispanic-negative)]
Extrinsic affective Simon task We calculated im-
plicit bias in the EAST as specifi ed by De Houwer 
(2003). The analysis focused on correct responses 
to trials involving the blue–green words, which 
were positive or negative in valence. Reaction 
times from these trials falling below 300 ms or 
above 3000 ms were recoded to these minimum 
and maximum values, respectively. All latencies 
were then log transformed, and the resulting 
values were averaged within word valence and 
response button, yielding four means: positive 
words associated with Whites, negative words 
associated with Whites, positive words associ-
ated with Hispanics, negative words associated 
with Hispanics. From these four means, we 
calculated a measure of implicit bias analogous 
to our measure of explicit bias: the degree to 
which White names facilitate positive words more 
than negative words, whereas Hispanic names 
facilitate negative words more than positive 
words. [Implicit Bias = (White-negative—White-
positive)—(Hispanic-negative—Hispanic-
positive)]
Explicit intergroup bias On average and 
controlling for condition, the explicit bias 
index revealed negative intergroup bias (i.e. 
an evaluative preference for the outgroup), 
F(1, 108) = 42.64, p < .001. We repeatedly obtain 
this pattern with the percent estimate measure. 
However, the present research is concerned 
primarily with the effect of our manipulations 
on the magnitude of bias, not with the average 
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level of bias, itself. Between-subjects analysis 
revealed that, across levels of Conflict, the 
control versus ideology contrast was marginally 
signifi cant, F(1, 108) = 2.62, p = .11, refl ecting 
lower bias in the CB and MC conditions than in 
the control condition (see Table 2 for means). 
Importantly, and in line with our expectations, 
the contrast pitting CB against MC interacted 
with Confl ict, F(1, 108) = 4.04, p = .047. The 
data replicate the pattern found in Study 1: 
when Confl ict was low, CB and MC did not differ 
from one another, F(1, 108) = 0.94, p = .33; but 
when Confl ict was high, the CB condition tended 
to express less bias than the MC condition, 
F(1, 108) = 3.46, p = .066.
Implicit intergroup bias Controlling for con-
dition, the EAST index revealed a non-signifi cant 
pattern of pro-White bias, F(1, 108) = 2.16, 
p = .15. Perhaps because the EAST relies on 
relatively subtle Stroop-like processing of the 
meaning of the color words (rather than expli-
cit valence categorizations, as does the IAT), 
we typically obtain relatively small main effects 
with this task. However, as with the explicit 
measure, our primary interest is not in the 
overall level of pro-White bias, but rather in the 
variability of that bias as a function of condition. 
Importantly, analysis of the EAST index revealed 
an interaction between Confl ict and the control 
versus ideology contrast, F(1, 108) = 3.96, p = .050 
(see Table 2 for means). When Confl ict was low, 
the pattern of implicit bias was similar to that 
of explicit bias. The CB and MC conditions, 
on average, showed marginally lower bias than 
the control condition, F(1, 108) = 3.28, p = .073, 
but CB and MC did not differ from each other, 
F(1, 108) = 0.32, p = .57. (This result is rather 
striking in its own right. It suggests that, in the 
absence of confl ict, the induction of CB and 
MC ideologies may promote more positive 
attitudes toward an outgroup, even on an implicit 
measure, but see Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004.) 
Before turning to the high-confl ict condition, 
it is important to recall that, when confl ict was 
high, CB participants reported less explicit 
bias than their MC counterparts. We have sug-
gested that this decrease may not be due to more 
positive feelings, but rather that it constitutes 
an attempt on the part of the CB participants to 
downplay any resentment they feel (in line with 
the tenets of a CB ideology). In other words, 
CB participants may actually be just as upset 
by the confl ict as MC participants. In line with 
this possibility, an analysis of implicit bias in 
the high-Confl ict condition showed no effect 
of ideology, whatsoever. Neither the control 
versus ideology nor the CB versus MC contrast 
was signifi cant, F values < 1, p values > .34. (See 
Table 2 for means.)
Relationship between implicit and explicit 
bias The foregoing analyses demonstrate a 
sort of dissociation between explicit and implicit 
Table 2. Means (SD) of explicit intergroup bias and implicit intergroup bias as a function of Ideology (control, 
colorblind or multicultural) and Confl ict (low or high) from Study 2
Ideology
Control CB MC
Bias measure Confl ict
 Explicit  Low  –0.84 (2.07)  –1.20 (1.55)  –1.80 (1.82)
 High  –0.71 (2.18)  –1.96 (1.96)  –0.79 (2.21)
 Implicit (log-ms)  Low  0.056 (0.151)  –0.010 (0.102)  –0.035 (0.138)
 High  0.011 (0.146)  0.070 (0.129)  0.026 (0.177)
Note: Explicit bias is based on percentage estimates of the prevalence of positive minus negative traits for 
Whites relative to Hispanics. Implicit bias refl ects reaction times in the EAST, calculated as the degree to 
which responses to negative words were slower when they shared the same response as White (vs. Hispanic) 
plus the degree to which responses to positive words were slower when they shared the same response as 
Hispanic (vs. White). For both measures, higher numbers indicate greater bias. 
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measures in the CB condition. We suspect that 
CB participants, who have been told that group 
differences are problematic, may experience 
antipathy or resentment on an implicit level but 
refuse to explicitly acknowledge that negative 
reaction because doing so would violate the 
principles of the CB ideology. Accordingly, im-
plicit and explicit biases diverge. It is critical 
to note that this inverse relationship should 
hold regardless of the source of resentment. 
In the present studies, we manipulate confl ict 
over course enrollment, but the same inverse 
relationship should hold even if the prejudice 
stems from idiosyncratic, personal reasons. For 
example, a participant in the low-Confl ict CB 
condition may experience a similar implicit–
explicit dissociation if he or she (personally) 
resents Hispanics due to concerns over illegal 
immigration. MC participants, by contrast, have 
been told that differences and disagreements 
are acceptable. They may therefore be more 
willing to express subjective discontent on ex-
plicit measures. For the MC participants, then, 
implicit and explicit bias should correspond. If 
this explanation is correct, we might expect a 
more positive correlation between implicit and 
explicit measures for the MC condition than for 
the CB condition.
Beginning with our basic 3 × 2 ANOVA, and 
taking explicit bias as the criterion, we added 
implicit bias as a predictor to assess the rela-
tionship between it and explicit bias. We then 
expanded this model to test whether implicit 
bias interacts with the Ideology manipulation 
to predict explicit bias.4 This analytic approach 
is desirable because it not only assesses the 
differential relationship between implicit and 
explicit bias as a function of Ideology, but it 
simultaneously controls for main effects (on 
both indices) of the Confl ict manipulation. 
This analysis revealed that the relationship 
between implicit and explicit bias did indeed 
depend on the CB versus MC contrast, F(1, 
105) = 5.34, p = .023. As shown in Figure 1, the 
partial relationship between implicit and ex-
plicit bias (i.e. the slope of the line) was more 
positive in the MC condition than in the CB 
condition, and indeed approached a signifi cantly 
negative relation among the CB participants, 
F(1, 105) = 3.17, p = .078.
Again, it is important to note that, theoretically, 
the CB dissociation between implicit and explicit 
measures should not be induced by our Confl ict 
manipulation. The same pressure to minimize 
or ignore group differences should hold for CB 
participants in both the low- and high-Confl ict 
Figure 1. The relationship between explicit and implicit measures of intergroup bias as a function of Ideology 
(control, colorblind, or multicultural).
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conditions. Indeed, a test of the 3-way interaction 
between implicit bias, Confl ict and the CB versus 
MC contrast was not signifi cant, F(1,  102) = 0.48, 
p = .49. This analysis suggests that the nature 
of the implicit–explicit relationship does not 
differ between the two Confl ict conditions. 
Rather, in the high-Confl ict condition, we simply 
make salient a particular source of intergroup 
tension. In so doing, we increase the level of 
implicit bias and correspondingly decrease the 
level of explicit bias that CB participants are 
willing to report.
In the CB condition, greater implicit bias 
was associated with lower explicit prejudice, 
suggesting that participants compensated for 
their internal resentment with overly positive 
evaluations of the outgroup. In as much as CB 
participants were told that any group difference 
is problematic, this type of suppression may 
refl ect an experimentally induced motivation 
to present an egalitarian façade (Fazio et al., 
1995; Plant & Devine, 1998). Such a motivation 
may certainly be desirable if it reduces the overt 
expression of bias, but research has also shown 
that suppressing bias can have unintended and 
ironic consequences. Suppression can actually 
increase bias when participants fi nally relax their 
guard (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 
1987). For example, Macrae and his colleagues 
asked participants to describe a day in the life of 
a skinhead. Those who were instructed to avoid 
the use of stereotypes during this initial writing 
task chose to sit farther from a skinhead during 
a subsequent activity—a decision that was taken 
to indicate a resurgence of negative thoughts 
(Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; 
see also Plant & Devine, 2001). In Study 3, we 
examined the possibility that the CB participants’ 
tendency to suppress prejudicial feelings would 
similarly backfi re and ultimately exacerbate 
negativity toward the Hispanic outgroup.
Study 3
Method
Participants and design Fifty White students in 
an introductory psychology course (76% female) 
participated in this study in partial completion 
of a course requirement.5 This experiment 
employed only the high-Confl ict condition and 
assessed prejudice both immediately after the 
confl ict induction and again after a 20-minute 
delay. The study followed a 3 (Ideology: control 
vs. CB vs. MC) × 2 (Time: 1 vs. 2) mixed-model 
design with repeated measures on the latter 
factor.
Materials and procedure In this study all 
participants read the high-Conflict article. 
Otherwise, the procedure (including our mani-
pulation of Ideology and our debriefi ng) was 
drawn from Studies 1 and 2.
Measures of pretest bias The psychology depart-
ment introduced a pretest questionnaire in the 
semester during which this study was conducted, 
allowing us to collect thermometer and percent 
estimate measures several weeks before the 
experimental session. Except for the response 
options, which were constrained by the pretest 
format, these measures were identical to those 
used in Studies 1 and 2. The thermometer asked 
participants to rate their feelings toward groups 
on a scale ranging from 1 (very coolly) to 10 (very 
warmly). The percent estimate measure asked 
participants to rate the percentage of Hispanics 
and Whites who possess each of the eight traits 
from Study 2 on a scale from 1 (0–10%) to 10 
(91–100%), with each intermediate point labeled 
accordingly (e.g. 6 = 51–60%).
Measures of Time 1 bias After the manipulation 
of Ideology and the high-Confl ict induction, 
participants were given a long questionnaire 
entitled Campus Life Survey. The fi rst section of 
the survey explained that interethnic relations 
were an important part of campus life and asked 
participants to rate their feelings toward several 
groups on a single item, ranging from 1 (very 
negative) to 7 (very positive). The goal of these 
items was to assess bias immediately after the 
Ideology manipulation and the presentation 
of the high-Confl ict scenario. At that point in 
time, CB participants were presumably frustrated 
regarding the policy but also felt most strongly 
the strictures against admitting confl ict between 
ethnic groups. Accordingly, we predicted they 
would take these measures as an opportunity to 
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express egalitarian views, presumably inhibiting 
any prejudiced reactions (as in Studies 1 and 2). 
We did not want to overwhelm our participants 
with questions about prejudice at Time 1 for fear 
that rehearsing their attitudes would attenuate 
shifts at Time 2. This single item therefore pro-
vided our only Time 1 measure of bias.
Filler task The remainder of the Campus Life 
Survey served as a fi ller task, with questions about 
participants’ familiarity with school resources 
(e.g. libraries, counseling and resource centers), 
their academic and social goals for their time in 
college, etc. The items were drawn from an actual 
survey conducted by the administration and took 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.
Measures of Time 2 bias After completing the 
Campus Life Survey, participants were asked 
to take a few minutes to fi ll out a measure that 
was described as a pilot test for a graduate 
student’s dissertation. Participants were asked 
to complete percent estimates for a variety of 
groups, each presented on a different page. 
Like Study 2, this packet included pages for 
several groups other than Hispanics and Whites 
(i.e. gay men, Blacks, and feminists). Unlike 
Study 2, however, this assessment of bias oc-
curred after a substantial delay during which 
participants’ vigilance regarding the inhibition 
of prejudice might be expected to wane. For 
CB participants, who were initially expected 
to suppress prejudice, this lack of caution was 
expected to promote a backlash, actually leading 
to greater expression of intergroup bias.
Results and discussion
Statistical control Thermometer and percent 
estimate bias measures, collected during the 
pretest, were calculated as in Studies 1 and 2, 
respectively, then standardized and averaged. 
All analyses in Study 3 were performed with an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) including this 
index of pretest bias as a covariate.
Because all participants experienced high 
Confl ict, ratings of helpfulness were not expected 
to vary by condition. As anticipated, participants 
generally rated the policy as helpful to minorities 
(adjusted M = 8.24) and antagonistic to the 
interests of White students (adjusted M = 2.41). 
Further, neither rating depended on condition, 
F values < 1.5, p values > .22. The pretest co-
variate was not signifi cantly related to either 
minority or White helpfulness ratings, F values 
(1, 44) = 1.92, 1.89, p values = .17.
Intergroup bias We examined bias as a func-
tion of Ideology and Time. Because the Time 1 
and Time 2 measures used different metrics, we 
fi rst standardized the scores separately at each 
time point. Though this approach allows us to 
examine whether the relationships between the 
three Ideology conditions vary as a function of 
time, it renders absolute cross-time comparisons 
effectively meaningless (at both points, the 
average level of bias is zero because of the 
standardization). We then submitted them to 
a 3 × 2 mixed-model ANCOVA. This analysis 
revealed the expected interaction between 
Time and the CB versus MC contrast, F(1, 
44) = 16.06, p = .0002 (see Table 3), and between 
Time and the control versus ideology contrast, 
F(1, 44) = 4.67, p = .036. We also obtained an 
unexpected interaction between Time and the 
pretest covariate, F(1, 44) = 4.73, p = .035. To 
clarify the meaning of these effects, we analyzed 
bias separately at Time 1 and Time 2.
Time 1 bias Tests of bias at Time 1 replicated the 
high-Confl ict conditions in Studies 1 and 2, such 
that participants in the CB condition reported 
less bias than participants in the MC condition, 
Table 3. Adjusted means of standardized intergroup 
bias as a function of Ideology (control, colorblind or 
multicultural) and Time from Study 3
Ideology
Control CB MC
Time 1 0.40 –0.38 0.08
Time 2 0.03 0.15 –0.18
Note : Time 1 bias is based on warmth-type Likert 
ratings of Whites minus Hispanics. Time 2 bias 
refl ects percent estimate ratings of the prevalence of 
positive minus negative traits among Whites minus 
Hispanics. Each bias measure was standardized prior 
to analysis.
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F(1, 45) = 3.57, p = .056. The contrast pitting 
control participants against the average of the 
two ideological conditions was not signifi cant, 
F(1, 45) = 1.44, p = .24, though—as is clear from 
the adjusted means—controls expressed relatively 
high levels of bias. The pretest bias covariate 
was signifi cant, F(1, 45) = 7.72, p = .008, and 
positively related to Time 1 bias, presumably 
refl ecting stable individual differences in at-
titudes toward Hispanics and Whites.
Time 2 bias A very different pattern emerged 
at Time 2. After the 20-minute delay, and in an 
ostensibly different context, participants in 
the CB condition reported higher levels of bias 
than participants in the MC condition, F(1, 
44) = 8.29, p = .006. Again, the control con-
dition did not differ from the average of CB 
and MC, F(1, 44) = 1.79, p = .19, and the pretest 
bias covariate was signifi cant, F(1, 44) = 24.64, 
p < .0001. Moreover—as indicated by the signi-
fi cant interaction between Time and the pretest 
covariate—this effect was stronger at Time 2 
than Time 1. This probably refl ects the fact 
that the pretest measures were more similar in 
structure to the dependent variables at Time 2 
than at Time 1.
To specifi cally test the possibility of a rebound, 
we also calculated the difference between Time 2 
bias and baseline (pretest) bias, with positive 
scores refl ecting an increase in bias at Time 2. 
CB participants showed a signifi cant increase, 
suggesting a rebound to levels above baseline, 
F(1, 45) = 5.57, p = .023. MC participants actually 
showed a signifi cant decrease relative to base-
line, F(1, 45) = 4.08, p = .049.6
Initially, in a high-confl ict situation, CB par-
ticipants expressed less intergroup bias than 
MC participants, but these same participants 
subsequently rebounded, showing higher levels 
of bias than their MC counterparts. We suggest 
that this boomerang pattern stems from the 
CB participants’ attempts to suppress feelings 
of negativity that stem from the intergroup 
confl ict (as in Study 2) because—from a CB 
perspective—these feelings threaten intergroup 
harmony. Ironically, this early suppression seems 
to exacerbate prejudice in the long run. The MC 
participants, for whom group differences may be 
more acceptable, showed no such rebound.
One may reasonably wonder if the results 
of Studies 1–3 refl ect differences between MC 
and CB strategies, broadly speaking, or if instead 
they depend on some particular aspect of our 
manipulation. Perhaps, for example, a par-
ticipant who adopts a CB perspective because 
she is, in essence, asked to do so does not adhere 
to this ideology in quite the same way as a par-
ticipant who naturally adopts a CB mindset 
for personal reasons. In Study 4, we therefore 
sought to replicate Study 3’s basic fi nding, but 
in this fi nal study we measured ideology rather 
than manipulating it.
Study 4
In Study 4, prior to the experimental session, 
participants rated their endorsement of both 
CB and MC ideologies during mass pretesting. 
In the lab, we then manipulated confl ict and, 
after a 20-minute delay, assessed intergroup 
bias. Study 4 therefore focuses on the post-delay 
consequences of confl ict for both CB and MC 
ideologies. The results of Studies 1–3 suggest 
that, when confl ict is low, both CB and MC 
ideologies can reduce bias. Although we have 
not yet tested the longevity of that effect, we 
have no a priori reason to predict that it will 
change as a function of a delay. That is, in the 
low-Confl ict condition, we have no reason to 
believe that either CB or MC participants are 
suppressing resentment (after all, there is no 
confl ict), and so, we have no reason to predict 
that bias will rebound for either ideology. When 
Confl ict is high, by contrast, CB participants in 
Study 3 showed evidence of rebound effects, 
reporting greater bias than MC participants 
after a 20-minute delay. Based on these results, 
we can derive predictions for Study 4. Since both 
strategies effectively reduce bias when Confl ict 
is low, we expect that stronger endorsement of 
either ideology should be associated with lower 
levels of bias. That is, in the absence of con-
fl ict, it should make little difference whether 
participants prefer a CB or MC point of view. 
Support for either perspective should yield 
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relatively favorable ratings of the outgroup. 
When confl ict increases, however, preference 
for a particular ideology over the other should 
begin to matter more. In other words, we expect 
the level of Confl ict to interact with partici-
pants’ ideological preferences. In essence, as 
the level of Confl ict increases, multiculturalism 
should become a more effective strategy, with 
MC participants reporting less post-delay bias 
than those preferring a CB view.
Method
Participants Seventy White students (50% 
female) in an introductory psychology course 
at the University of Colorado (CU) took part 
in this study, in partial completion of a course 
requirement.7
Design Unlike Studies 1–3, Study 4 involved no 
manipulation of ideology. Instead, during a mass 
pretesting, participants were asked to complete 
a questionnaire assessing personal endorse-
ment of CB and MC ideologies. During the ex-
perimental session, we assigned participants to 
one of two levels of Confl ict, low versus high. 
The design of the study, then, involved a simple 
between-participant manipulation of Confl ict 
(low vs. high) with both CB and MC ideologies 
measured continuously as individual-difference 
variables.
Materials and procedure
Ideology measurement Two fi ve-item ideology 
measures were taken from Wolsko (2002; 
Wolsko et al., 2006). Participants were asked 
to respond to questions such as ‘To create a 
harmonious society, we must look beyond skin 
color and understand the person within, to see 
each person as an individual who is part of the 
larger group, “Americans”’ (CB, alpha = .81), 
or ‘Understanding both the similarities and 
differences among ethnic groups is an essential 
component of long-term social harmony in the 
United States’ (MC, alpha = .86). Responses were 
made on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Conflict  manipulation (newspaper ar t ic le) 
Manipulation of Confl ict was accomplished 
as in Studies 1 and 2. Again, participants com-
pleted a manipulation check, rating the degree 
to which the proposed policy would increase or 
decrease minority and White students’ chances 
of registering for classes.
Delay Participants next completed a series 
of fi ller tasks, which took approximately 20 
minutes.
Measures of intergroup bias After the delay, par-
ticipants completed measures of intergroup 
bias. This packet included a thermometer as well 
as semantic differential scales. Participants were 
asked to rate Hispanics and Whites (embedded 
in a variety of other groups) on 11 seven-point 
scales anchored by positive and negative adjec-
tive adjectives with no stereotype content (e.g. 
nice–awful, cruel–kind). Finally, participants 
were extensively debriefed.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks As in Studies 1 and 2, we 
assessed the effect of our Confl ict manipulation 
by examining participants’ reports concerning 
the effect of the registration policy. Again, par-
ticipants in both conditions felt that the policy 
would help minorities, and that perception did 
not depend on confl ict (high Confl ict M = 8.10, 
low Confl ict M = 8.00), F(1, 68) = 0.22, p = 64. 
However, participants in the high-Conflict 
condition (M = 2.66) rated the policy as much 
more costly to Whites than did the low-Confl ict 
participants (M = 4.12), F(1, 68) = 16.97, 
p < .0001. Again, these data suggest that our con-
fl ict manipulation was successful: in the high-
Confl ict condition, the outgroup’s gain comes 
at a cost to the ingroup.
Intergroup bias We computed two indices of 
bias, one based on the thermometer, and one 
based on the semantic differential. Thermometer 
bias was calculated as before. For the semantic 
differentials, we calculated the degree to which 
participants rated Whites and (separately) 
Hispanics more positively than negatively, then 
calculated the difference between ratings of 
the two target groups. For both thermometer 
and semantic differential indices, higher scores 
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refl ect greater positivity toward Whites than 
toward Hispanics. The two measures were cor-
related, r(68) = .65, p < .0001, and to improve 
reliability, we standardized and averaged them 
to form an overall bias index.
Our primary predictions for Study 4 were 
that endorsement of either the CB or MC 
ideology would reduce bias in the low-Confl ict 
condition, but that Confl ict would interact with 
ideological preference, such that as Confl ict in-
creased, multiculturalism would become a 
more effective prejudice-reduction strategy 
than colorblindness. Assessing these effects in 
a measurement study is complicated by the fact 
that CB and MC ideologies are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, many participants 
endorsed elements of both ideologies, and the 
two measures were significantly correlated, 
r(68) = 0.48, p < .0001. In essence, this overlap 
between the scales may represent general sup-
port for ethnic or racial equality, regardless of 
the manner (CB or MC) in which that equality 
is obtained.
To address this overlap statistically, we com-
puted two indices. The first index is the 
computed average of the CB and MC measures. 
Conceptually, it represents a general desire for 
intergroup harmony regardless of ideology. 
The second index is the difference between the 
measures (CB—MC), and represents the pre-
ference for a CB, rather than an MC, approach 
to intergroup relations. It is important to note 
that these two indices correspond nicely to our 
dual predictions for this study. First, endorse-
ment of either ideology (or both) is refl ected 
in the average, and this average should be asso-
ciated with a reduction in bias when confl ict is 
low. Second, a preference for colorblindness 
versus multiculturalism is refl ected in the dif-
ference score, which should interact with the 
level of Conflict, such that—as conflict in-
creases—multiculturalism reduces prejudice 
more effectively than colorblindness. To test 
these hypotheses, we regressed our index of 
intergroup bias on the CB–MC average, the 
CB–MC difference (both mean centered), a 
contrast code refl ecting our Confl ict condition 
and the interactions of Confl ict with both the 
average and the difference scores.
This analysis revealed several interesting 
effects. As in Studies 1 and 2, we found that an 
increase in the level of Confl ict led to a counter-
intuitive decrease in reported bias, F(1, 64) = 5.06, 
p < .028. More germane to our fi rst prediction, 
Confl ict interacted with the CB–MC average, 
F(1, 64) = 3.88, p < .053. To elucidate this effect, 
we analyzed the effects of the CB–MC average 
once in the low-Confl ict condition and once in 
the high-Confl ict condition. In line with our 
predictions, when Confl ict was low, participants 
with higher scores on both CB and MC scales (a 
higher average, or greater preference for group 
equality regardless of strategy) reported less 
prejudice than those with lower average scores, 
F(1, 64) = 5.57, p < .021. When Confl ict was high, 
this relationship weakened to the point that 
the CB–MC average was completely unrelated 
to reported bias, F(1, 64) = 0.12, p < .72.
We also observed the predicted interaction 
between Confl ict and the CB–MC difference 
score, F(1, 64) = 3.67, p < .059. Strategy pre-
ference (CB vs. MC) made no difference on 
average, F(1, 64) = 0.48, p < .49. But, in line with 
predictions, as the level of Confl ict increased, 
endorsement of a multicultural perspective 
was associated with lower levels of bias than 
endorsement of a colorblind perspective.
As final perspectives on these data, we 
analyzed the bias index twice more. Once as 
a function of MC endorsement, Confl ict, and 
the MC × Confl ict interaction; and once as a 
function of CB endorsement, Confl ict, and 
the CB × Confl ict interaction. The MC analysis 
revealed a marginal main effect such that 
stronger endorsement of multiculturalism 
tended to reduce bias on average, F(1, 66) = 2.69, 
p = .10. Importantly, and as predicted, this 
pattern was not moderated by the level of 
Confl ict, F(1, 66) = 1.14, p < .29.
Turning to the CB analysis, we observed a 
very different pattern of results. On average, 
stronger endorsement of a CB perspective was 
not signifi cantly associated with a reduction in 
bias, F(1, 66) = 2.28, p < .14. However, the effect 
of CB endorsement depended heavily on the 
level of Confl ict, as attested by the CB × Confl ict 
interaction, F(1, 66) = 8.76, p < .005. When Con-
flict was low, participants who endorsed 
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colorblindness showed clear reductions in bias, 
F(1, 66) = 8.35, p < .005. But when Confl ict was 
high, this benefi cial effect of CB ideology dis-
appeared and even reversed direction, though 
not signifi cantly so, F(1, 66) = 1.30, p < .26.
The data from Study 4, in which bias was 
assessed after a delay, conform fairly well to our 
predictions and our prior results. In line with 
Studies 1 and 2, support for both ideologies 
tends to reduce intergroup bias when confl ict is 
low. But this generalized benefi t weakens under 
high-Confl ict conditions. At the same time (and 
in line with Study 3), the induction of Confl ict 
tends to increase the post-delay effi cacy of an 
MC perspective (relative to a CB perspective). 
Further, Confl ict does not seem to moderate the 
effi cacy of a MC approach to prejudice reduc-
tion, but it has dramatic effects on the effi cacy of 
colorblindness. In sum, then, this correlational 
study largely replicates the results of Study 3’s 
experimental manipulation.
General discussion
In four studies, we tested the effi cacy of CB 
and MC bias-reduction strategies in situations 
characterized by either low or high levels 
of ethnic confl ict. In Studies 1 and 2, when 
Confl ict was low, White participants who were 
induced to accept CB and MC ideologies 
exhibited less prejudice than controls. These 
effects replicate previous work showing that 
the two strategies reduce bias in roughly equal 
measure (Wolsko et al., 2000). In the high-
Confl ict conditions, however, a different pat-
tern emerged: CB participants reported lower 
levels of prejudice than MC participants. 
Indeed, for CB participants, manipulations 
that increased the severity of confl ict tended 
to counterintuitively reduce the expression of 
bias. This pattern violates the assumption that 
greater conflict promotes greater hostility 
(Sherif et al., 1961) and raises the possibility 
that CB participants inhibited any resentment 
they may have felt due to the confl ict. We rea-
soned that, for CB participants, a dispute be-
tween groups threatens the principle tenet of 
their ideology. The emotion-laden confl ict of 
interest, in essence, threatens to prove that group 
differences do matter—that the participants 
cannot ignore ethnicity. To address this threat, 
CB participants may suppress their initial frus-
tration. Study 2 examined suppression, using 
an implicit measure of bias designed to impair 
strategic control. In Study 2, CB participants in 
the high-Confl ict situation reported less bias 
on explicit measures (relative to MC partici-
pants), but as predicted they exhibited greater 
bias on the implicit measure. In Study 3, we 
examined the possibility that the CB participants’ 
self-restraint would reduce the expression of 
prejudice in the short term but that, once their 
vigilance faltered, prejudice would rebound (an 
ironic-process effect; Wegner et al., 1987). As pre-
dicted, results from this study showed that, 
although bias in a high-Confl ict situation initi-
ally dropped, CB participants reported greater 
prejudice when re-assessed after a 20-minute 
delay. Finally, Study 4 provided a conceptual 
replication of Study 3, showing that the long-
term effects of CB and MC strategies hold 
even when ideology is measured rather than 
manipulated. After a 20-minute delay, partici-
pants who endorsed an MC perspective showed 
marginal reductions in bias, and this effect was 
not moderated by Confl ict. Participants who 
endorsed a CB view showed reductions in bias 
when Confl ict was low, but the benefi ts of this 
perspective vanished when Confl ict was high.
A CB ideology is predicated on the idea that 
groups are fundamentally the same. These 
studies suggest that participants who adopted 
such an ideology experienced a struggle in 
situations characterized by intergroup confl ict. 
Though they did not express prejudice openly, 
confl ict-induced bias manifested itself on more 
subtle implicit measures and in situations that 
were temporally removed from the Confl ict in-
duction. Participants who adopted an MC ideo-
logy, which allows and even encourages the 
recognition of group differences, initially ex-
pressed greater bias in high-confl ict situations. 
Perhaps as a consequence, these individuals 
showed no dissociation between implicit and 
explicit measures, nor did they exhibit ironic-
process effects.
It may be argued that the registration policy 
used to manipulate conflict in the present 
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studies is, by its nature, more consistent with 
multiculturalism than with colorblindness. 
After all, the policy would have given preferen-
tial treatment to minorities, thus recognizing 
(rather than minimizing) group differences. 
Is it surprising, then, that CB participants re-
sponded with some negativity? This seems an 
interesting question, and future research might 
profi tably manipulate the nature of such a policy 
(e.g. inducing confl ict by implementing a CB 
policy that eliminates privileges, such as affi r-
mative action, traditionally afforded to one 
group). However, for a variety of reasons, we do 
not believe that the results of these studies re-
fl ect the MC nature of the registration policy. 
First, and most obviously, the MC aspect of the 
policy was held constant. In both the high- and 
low-Confl ict conditions, minority students stood 
to gain special access to classes. The difference 
between the conditions was simply the degree 
to which White students would suffer as a result. 
In other words, we manipulated the degree to 
which the policy created a zero-sum situation, 
not the degree to which the policy recognized 
group differences. Accordingly, effects of our 
independent variable, Conflict, cannot be 
attributed to changes in the MC nature of the 
policy. Second, the results clearly indicate that 
participants in the MC condition were as resist-
ant to the high-Confl ict policy as anybody else. 
In no case did the MC condition rate the policy 
as less damaging to the interests of White 
students than did the other conditions. Third, 
on initial measures of bias—implicit as well as 
explicit—MC participants expressed levels of 
prejudice as great as or greater than those 
expressed by CB participants (Studies 1 and 2, 
Study 3 Time 1). It certainly does not seem then 
that MC participants responded more favorably 
to the policy.
The behavior of the control participants in 
these studies warrants discussion. As noted 
earlier, controls expressed greater prejudice 
than either CB or MC participants when confl ict 
was absent (Studies 1 and 2). When confl ict was 
high, however, controls showed a less consistent 
pattern of effects. In Study 1, they seemed to 
mirror the CB participants (exhibiting lower 
levels of bias than MC participants); in Studies 
2 and 3, however, controls looked more similar 
to the MC condition (exhibiting higher levels 
of bias at early stages, and lower bias after the 
delay in Study 3 relative to CB participants). 
Although we have no defi nitive information 
about the cause of this shift, it is possible that 
participants in the control condition (who 
were simply asked to spend time thinking 
about ethnic relations) generated qualitatively 
different kinds of thoughts across the three 
studies, sometimes leaning more toward a CB 
ideology, and other times leaning more toward 
multiculturalism. Certainly, Study 4 suggests 
that naturally occurring individual differences 
in ideology can produce effects that generally 
mirror our experimental manipulations. In 
combination with the tension of the high-
Confl ict condition, these spontaneous thoughts 
may have evoked very different reactions. Such 
fl uctuations obviously complicate our attempts 
to understand the effects of confl ict, but we 
feel that our conclusions regarding the CB con-
dition’s resistance and rebound remain largely 
unchanged.
The findings of the present studies seem 
congruent with the suggestion, advanced by 
Pettigrew (2000) and Gaertner and Dovidio 
(Gaertner et al., 2000), that efforts to improve 
intergroup relations might profi t from the use 
of multiple prejudice-reduction strategies. By 
tailoring the strategy to the situation, groups 
may progress toward greater levels of harmony. 
During periods of greater hostility, CB strategies 
may serve a valuable purpose. For example, 
by characterizing group members simply as 
individuals—fundamentally the same and fun-
damentally equal—decategorization may erode 
group divisions and begin to open channels of 
communication. Similarly, recategorization (the 
recognition of a common, superordinate iden-
tity) may inspire thoughts of common fate and 
positive interdependence between the groups. 
Even if these strategies induce a degree of tension 
among group members, the present studies 
suggest that the CB approach can reduce the 
immediate, explicit expression of prejudice. By 
doing so, these strategies may pave the way for 
improved relations. In a similar vein, Nicole 
Shelton and her colleagues (Shelton, Richeson, 
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Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005) suggest that high-
prejudice Whites may engage in greater self-
regulation when interacting with a Black partner, 
and this effort may promote a more positive 
interaction. Somewhat ironically, Black par-
ticipants in their study reported greater liking 
for high-prejudiced (rather than low-prejudiced) 
White interaction partners. These fi ndings make 
sense to the extent that privately held prejudice 
led these individuals to display an especially 
positive public façade, much like the colorblind 
participants in Study 2. This discretion may serve 
a valuable function by facilitating initial positive 
intergroup interaction. At the same time, that 
façade may eventually break down under the wear 
and tear of long-term interaction. The ultimate 
success of a relationship may have more to do 
with deep-seated biases and depend less on the 
individual’s motivation (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 
2006). Once members of the two groups have 
established a tentative working relationship, 
therefore, MC strategies may further reduce 
prejudice and allow individuals to recognize 
and appreciate the unique strengths of their 
own group as well as those of the outgroup. If 
those differences subsequently give rise to the 
occasional dispute, multiculturalism may also 
help group members see the confl ict in a broader, 
more positive intergroup context.
In an increasingly diverse society, contact and 
confl ict between groups is inevitable. More-
over, these encounters may often have serious, 
psychologically meaningful consequences for 
the people involved. Jobs may be lost, property 
values may drop, cherished beliefs and customs 
may collide. To fully understand the utility of 
interventions intended to improve intergroup 
relations, experimental research must examine 
their effi cacy in situations that involve partici-
pants personally and emotionally. Creating this 
tension (ethically) in the laboratory is not a 
trivial task, but—as these studies show—doing 
so may yield results that differ dramatically 
from results obtained in more typical experi-
mental settings.
Notes
1. We excluded four White participants from the 
analyses. Three questioned the veracity of the 
manipulation (one each in the 
CB/high-Confl ict, CB/low-Confl ict, and 
MC/low-Confl ict conditions), and one 
(CB/high) was an outlier in the analysis with 
a Cook’s D of .098.
2. Degrees of freedom are reduced for some 
analyses in each study due to missing data (Study 
1: distinctiveness; Study 2: helpfulness; Study 3: 
Time 2 bias).
3. We excluded fi ve participants. Two had 
incomplete data on the EAST due to 
experimenter error; one control/low-Confl ict 
participant questioned the article; one control/
high-Confl ict participant expressed openly racist 
attitudes on an initial questionnaire (prior to 
the manipulation); and one MC/low-Confl ict 
participant was an outlier on the EAST with a 
Cook’s D of .088.
4. Explicit Bias = β0 + β1 * Confl ict + β2 * Ideol 
versus Control + β3 * CB versus MC + β4 * 
Implicit Bias + β5 * (Ideol vs. Control * Implicit 
Bias) +β6 * (CB vs. MC * Implicit Bias).
5. We excluded one CB participant who was an 
outlier on the Time 2 prejudice measure with 
Cook’s D of  .17.
6. Analyses controlling for pretest scores (rather 
than calculating a difference score) yield 
similar results.
7. We excluded three outliers (Cook’s D > .11) 
from the analyses. If these individuals are 
included, the critical interaction between 
Confl ict and the MC–CB difference score 
actually becomes stronger, F(1, 67) = 6.55, p < .01.
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